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Unassigned Direct Material (UDM) accounts at naval
shipyards, which consist of surplus material from the
overhaul process, continue to grow at a rapid pace (42% per
year since 1985) . Minimal return on material placed in
these accounts coupled with a shrinking defense budget has
forced the Navy to take a closer look at inventory methods
at naval shipyards. The author, in an effort to propose
potential solutions to the growing UDM account problem
reviewed the current policies and procedures governing
inventory control/ inventory management at naval shipyards.
Extensive interviews were conducted with personnel at
NAVSEA, SPCC, and all eight naval shipyards with emphasis at
Mare Island Naval Shipyard. The current policy outlined by
NAVSEA needs to be better implemented. This coupled with a
two-pronged effort aimed at creating a historical usage
database to better identify material requirements and
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I. INTRODUCTION
The catalyst for this research is constantly increasing
unassigned direct material (UDM) inventory accounts at naval
shipyards. This increase is caused by more material being
ordered for an overhaul or limited availability than is
ultimately used. In an attempt to control the monetary size
of these accounts and to reclaim limited physical storage
space, the material is returned to the supply system or sent
to disposal. The result is a financial loss to the
shipyard. This reduces the revolving fund the shipyard
operates under and will ultimately necessitate additional
funding from the Navy.
Several problems surround unassigned direct material.
Foremost is that naval shipyards must operate within a
restricted budget. Thus, any program such as UDM which
could potentially be improved and save the shipyards money
is a high priority. Also, the Navy has a limited number of
ships and submarines to support the nation's Maritime
Strategy. These force constraints create pressure on the
shipyards to strictly adhere to an overhaul turn-around time
outlined by the Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) . Slippage of this timetable could result in
performing the same operations with a reduced number of
vessels. Obviously, if a ship/submarine remains in overhaul
beyond the desired time other vessels must delay their
overhauls and absorb additional operations. As a
consequence, the emphasis at shipyards is usually on
expediting overhaul production at the expense of cost over-
runs. The subsequent impact on material accounts is a
disregard for expense as extra material is ordered to
prevent production delays.
A. NAVAL SHIPYARD MISSION
NAVSEA, having the overall responsibility for the
maintenance of Navy ships, has assigned the following
functions to the eight naval shipyards:
1. Providing logistic support to activities and units of
the Operating Forces of the U.S. Navy and naval shore
(field) activities, as assigned by competent authority.
2. Performing authorized shipwork in connection with the
construction, conversion, overhaul, repair, alteration,
activation, inactivation and outfitting of naval ships and
service craft.
3. Performing authorized repairables work in connection
with repair, restoration, refit, refurbishment and
overhaul of systems, equipments, components and modules as
scheduled.
4. Designing naval ships when so designated.
5. Operating as a planning yard for ship alterations and
preparing allowance lists for ships under construction and
conversion in accordance with instructions issued by the
Naval Sea Systems Command.
6. Performing research, development, test and evaluation
work, as assigned.
7. Serving as a stock point for designated material, as
assigned.
8. Providing accounting, civilian payroll, savings bonds,
public works, industrial relations, medical, dental,
berthing, messing, fire prevention and fire protection,
security and other services to naval shore (field)
activities and other government agencies, as assigned.
9. Performing manufacturing, as assigned.
10. Accomplishing shore-electronics work; as requested by
the Space and Warfare Systems Command (SPAWARS)
.
11. Preparing and maintaining development, logistic
support, disaster control and other plans, as assigned.
12. Performing work for other U.S. Government
Departments, private parties and foreign governments, as
directed by competent authority. [Ref. l:pp. 3-4]
The extent to which the above functions are applicable
to a specific shipyard is dependent upon that shipyard's
capabilities. For example, Philadelphia and Long Beach
Naval Shipyards have no nuclear maintenance capability.
Overhaul and repair is also conducted at private
shipyards. The Navy monitors the work at these shipyards to
ensure the requisite quality of repair and contract
compliance. An in-depth look at private shipyard operations
is beyond the scope of this study.
B. SHIPYARD MATERIAL PLANNING
Because the emphasis of this study will be on inventory
control/inventory management, only those portions of the
organization are discussed. Specifically, these are the
supply department and the planning department.
NAVSEA issues a directive outlining the schedule of ship
overhauls tentatively planned for shipyards 24 months prior
to the start of these overhauls. Once these assignments are
made, a ship's Type Commander (for example, Commander
Submarine Force Pacific (COMSUBPAC) ) begins communicating to
the planning department of the assigned shipyard the
specific work requirements desired for the overhaul.
The result of this communication is a work package
defining all work to be accomplished during an overhaul.
This work package is further broken down into job orders
which define in detail the work to be accomplished on
specific systems within the ship. Within these job orders
are key events or key operations (key-ops) defined by
shipyard management to be critical events in the overhaul.
There can be several key-ops within one job order. Often
these key-ops are the "critical path" of the project's
network of activities requiring completion.
Once the scope of work has been defined, the planners
and estimators attached to the planning department begin
evaluating the material and man-hours required to complete
the defined work. This job order system is also a method of
documenting the maintenance cost associated with each system
repair. The material requirements for each job order are
outlined on a job material list (JML)
.
The JML's are then researched to ensure the material
outlined meets all the technical requirements and dimension
specifications for the system in which it will be installed.
These JML's are subsequently submitted to the supply
department for material requisitioning. The supply
department is tasked with ordering, receiving, storing and
issuing the material. Ultimately the material is issued to
production shops who are the end users.
Material is broken down into two categories, standard
and non-standard. Standard stock can come from two
agencies. The Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) provides
systems and components unique to the Navy. The Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) supplies materials common to all
Department of Defense agencies. SPCC- and DLA-furnished
material is processed and distributed by the regional Naval
Supply Centers that support individual shipyards. Non-
standard stock is material not carried by the Navy Stock
System or by DLA.
The goal is to receive all material in time to support
the industrial process. There are several methods used to
do this. First, on the JML there is a required delivery
date. This is a "drop dead date" by which the material must
be received to support work. Also, a priority is listed on
the requisition which tells the organization shipping the
material how urgently the material is needed. Finally, each
supply department has a code that handles nothing but
expediting. Their sole purpose is to attempt to speed up
the delivery process or search for alternate sources for the
material if it becomes apparent the material will not arrive
in time to support the industrial process.
An important interface is that between the estimators of
the planning department and the shop planners who are
associated with the production shops. Because of their
"hands on" experience, shop planners may identify material
requirements not understood or foreseen by the estimators.
Also, they may realize that historical usage does not
justify all the material outlined on a technical repair
standard (TRS) , thus avoiding excess material at the
completion of the overhaul.
C. NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND
In these times of limited budgets, it is important to
understand how the man-hours and material discussed in the
previous section are funded. The Navy Industrial Fund was
established to assist certain activities to function in a
more efficient manner. The reasoning behind this concept
was to free these activities of the worry associated with
total dependence on cyclic annual appropriations.
NIF activities operate on a "revolving fund" basis.
This means they are initially appropriated an amount of
working capital (called NIF corpus) which is used to finance
their operations from the time the work begins until payment
is received from the customer. [Ref. 2:p. 13]
To qualify as a NIF activity an organization's
operations must have a buyer-seller relationship and produce
their goods or provide services for more than one customer.
While providing services, the NIF activity must comply with
most of the following Department of Defense (DOD)
objectives:
Provide efficient modern management tools similar to those
used by private enterprises; provide incentives for cost
control and estimating required by the buyer-seller
contractual relationship; financial planning dependent on
reimbursements received; coordinate labor force and
inventories with work load; production scheduling and
control, procurement
#
and inventory control, budgeting and
cost control; use cost standards; require customers to
budget and account for all the goods and services ordered;
provide bills showing goods and services performed; enable
customer to budget on an end-product basis; predetermine
and standardize budgets; and improve customer's planning
and scheduling. [Ref. 2:p. 19]
All eight naval shipyards are NIF activities. They
accomplish many of the above objectives with the job order
costing system. Within this system, the customer order
acceptance record (COAR) is the basis for accumulating costs
billed to a customer. The COAR is a financial management
tool generated concurrently with the job order by planners
specifying the following:
(1) Services to be rendered and a required delivery
schedule,
(2) The quantity of funds authorized for the project
(i.e., direct labor man-hours, material, etc.), and
(3) A detailed breakdown of cost by item in the final
billing. [Ref. 3:p. J-7]
In summary, the NIF concept has three major features.
First, a contractual relationship is required between the
NIF activity and the customer. This forces the NIF activity
to better define the task and accurately estimate the
associated costs. Second, the job order costing system
associates costs with a specific job. This should allow the
costs related to a task to be better managed. Finally, the
revolving NIF corpus allows the activities to be freed from
the annual appropriations cycle.
A shrinking defense budget has forced shipyards to take
a closer look at costs and propose cost cutting measures
that will allow them to continue to operate within their
corpus. Increasing efficiency to reduce costs is in the
forefront of every shipyard comptroller's mind.
D. OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY
This study focuses on methods of reducing the costs
associated with surplus material resulting from an overhaul
(UDM) . Specifically, how can UDM accounts be reduced
thereby reducing the shrinkage rate of the NIF corpus?
Another objective of this study is to outline the management
tools available to shipyard managers to control/limit UDM
inventories.
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
The focus of this study is only on the UDM segment of
naval shipyards' inventory accounts. The resulting
recommendations are aimed at reducing the dollar value of
material that is placed into the UDM inventory after each
overhaul and increasing the usage of material from the UDM
account prior to excessing the material. By reducing the
dollars lost to inventory that is not used, the NIF corpus
will be buoyed and hence less susceptible to the annual
appropriations cycle.
The study is concentrated on the UDM inventory
control/management specifically at Mare Island Naval
Shipyard. Due to time and monetary constraints, an
evaluation of the other seven naval shipyards' UDM accounts
will be very limited. This study will not attempt to
evaluate DOD inventory control systems.
F. METHODOLOGY
Reports concerning inventory control/ inventory
management at naval shipyards were reviewed. This material
was supplemented with literature provided by the Naval
Postgraduate School faculty, the Knox Library at the Naval
Postgraduate School, the U.S. General Accounting Office, the
Naval Audit Service, Naval Sea Systems Command and Mare
Island Naval Shipyard.
This literature was reviewed to gain an understanding of
shipyard operations and current inventory management
policies. This information was supplemented by personal
observation of inventory management at Mare Island Naval
Shipyard. Questions arising during the study were answered
via telephone interviews with personnel at all eight naval
shipyards and at NAVSEA.
Problems outlined by previous studies were discussed
with shipyard personnel to determine their applicability.
Potential solutions were also discussed to justify their
feasibility.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY
Chapter II addresses the material management philosophy
in naval shipyards. Included are the process by which
inventory accounts are created and managed throughout a
ship ' s overhaul
.
Chapter III addresses the results of independent studies
done by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) and the
accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand. Although several of
these studies addressed naval shipyards as a whole, this
chapter focuses on the inventory control/ inventory
management segment of these studies at naval shipyards.
Chapter IV includes discussion of potential and actual
problems with the naval shipyard inventory process revealed
by this study and the financial impact of these problems.
The final chapter summarizes the findings of this study
and makes specific recommendations with respect to naval
shipyard inventory control procedures concerning UDM




Several classes of inventory exist in the shipyard.
These classes include Direct Material Inventory (DMI)
,
Unassigned Direct Material Inventory (UDM) , and Shop Stores
Inventory (SS) . This study will not consider the creation,
management or disposition of the shop stores inventory.
The creation of an inventory account for a specific
overhaul begins several years prior to the actual overhaul
commencement date. Extensive preplanning is necessary to
ensure long lead-time items are available prior to
commencing work associated with these components. Most of
the long lead-time high dollar value items are ordered by
NAVSEA and shipped prior to the overhaul start date. Once
the shipyard receives these items, they are assigned a
project number (to correlate material to project) and stored
in a warehouse until needed.
Other material requirements are identified by planners.
Each "job" is defined as to the scope of work to be
accomplished on a particular system. The job planner and
personnel from the lead shop identified on the job order
physically inspect the system to be worked on to identify
material requirements and potential problems. From this job
description and personal observations, a job material list
(JML) is generated which identifies all material required to
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complete the associated task. Formally recorded historical-
use data is not currently available to the planners.
Therefore, the planners use technical repair standards
(TRS) , allowance parts lists (APL) , direct observations, and
personal experience to generate the JML's.
The JML's are then sent to the supply department for
ordering. Once the supply department receives the JML, it
is mandated by current shipyard policy to process any
requisition within one day of receipt. This stringent
requirement was established to ensure the material is not
delayed by the administrative process. The date when the
material is needed is expressed by the required delivery
date (RDD) on the JML. This required delivery date is the
planners' best estimate as to when the job will begin.
Often the shipyard uses the overhaul commencement date as
the RDD. Each item when received will become part of that
project's DMI account. It will be identifiable by the
project number and the job order number.
No consideration is given to the availability or
location of material when processing the requisition. For
example, if Mare Island needs four gaskets and Naval Supply
Center (NSC) Oakland carries 30 of these gaskets, the
proximity and future availability of these parts is not
considered. This material is ordered the same time as the
longer lead-time, less-available material. The consequences
of this policy are that the material could get shipped to
12
Mare Island rapidly. This shifts the responsibility of
material management/ inventory control from the inventory
control point to the shipyard and increases the latter'
s
material storage and management costs.
A. DIRECT MATERIAL INVENTORY
Before looking at the UDM account policy, it is
necessary to first outline the policies governing UDM's
origin, the DMI account. The DMI account's purpose is to
provide material for specific projects (i.e., a particular
ship overhaul) . Prior to ordering material as a new
procurement, each JML for a job order/key-op is screened
through the shipyard's assets.
Material ordered for a particular project is reguired to
be on hand in sufficient time to prevent delaying the
industrial work. Often, planners will order contingency
material to supplement the core of material "reguired" to
complete the overhaul. Contingency material for this study
is defined as material that could potentially be necessary
to complete a job order/key-op. Each piece of material is
assigned to a job order/key-op to document an end-use
requirement. Contingency material with a unit value greater
than $5000 must be approved by the customer and the planning
officer. Contingency material with a unit value greater
than $2000 must be approved by the planning officer.
Once a job order/key-op is complete and closed, the
material not used can be handled several ways:
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(1) Transfer to DMI category 4 material at the completion
of the job order/key-op. This material is now
available for use on future job orders, or
(2) Reassign as DMI to a current job order/key-op, or
(3) Transfer to shop stores inventory if the material was
a shop stores item, or
(4) Transfer material to the UDM account no later than
60 days after the completion of the overhaul (shelf
life material and depot level repairables (DLR's) are
not transferred to UDM) , or
(5) Return the material to the supply system, or
(6) Send the material to disposal. Category 5 DMI is an
administrative designation for material waiting to be
excessed because it has been determined there is no
future use for it.
Also, at the completion of the job order/key-op material
ordered but not received will be reviewed for possible
cancellation.
As an overhaul progresses, material is issued from the
supply warehouses to the shops conducting the work.
Although the inventory system currently in use documents the
material issued for a particular job order/key-op, it does
not document material usage (the system assumes all material
issued is used) . Consequently, the shop performing the work
could hold unused material as bench spares. This practice
is strongly discouraged by shipyard management. Recently,
Mare Island set up a "gold pile recovery" program to recover
the bench spares held by shops. The program produced large
volumes of material which were fed directly into the UDM
account.
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Several other problems result from holding bench spares.
First, often the material documentation is lost. Therefore,
without performing expensive testing that is often cost
prohibitive, the material is useless. Secondly, the
material is no longer visible to the inventory system. If a
demand arises, a new procurement will be generated if
another identical item is not held in the UDM account.
Furthermore, the historical usage documentation process is
inaccurate due to supplementing issued material with bench
spares. Finally, if the incorrect material is used in a
system (which is possible if the documentation is lost) it
could result in material failure, personal injury, or in the
worst case loss of the ship.
B. UNASSIGNED DIRECT MATERIAL INVENTORY
It is important to note several significant events that
have effected UDM accounts in the past five years. First,
in 1984 the Navy placed a freeze on the disposal of
material. This freeze was lifted in 1988 but had already
caused the shipyards 1 inventory accounts to become swollen
with material that may never be used. Second, in 1984 the
Navy changed its policy concerning UDM. DMI from a project
used to be "rolled over" from one project to the next
without being entered into the UDM account. The change
mandated that once an overhaul was complete, the excess DMI
be placed in the UDM account. [Ref. 4] Finally, the
current policy concerning DMI and UDM was formulated in
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1988. A major change to the old policy is that material
need only be on hand in time to support the industrial
process. Prior to 1988, the requirement had been that all
material for the entire overhaul be on hand prior to the
overhaul commencement date. If a change occurred during the
overhaul the shipyard was often left with excess material to
dispose of. Because of the disposal freeze, unused material
generated because of this policy was and is still carried in
UDM accounts.
The purpose of the UDM account is to control, process
and issue material for future use or disposition. UDM
originates from two sources:





Material is retained in the UDM account for two years
beyond the customer order acceptance record (COAR) or longer
if:
(1) A specific requirement prevails, or
(2) NAVSEA directs, or
(3) "Sound management" dictates retention.
Standard stock may be disposed of in the following manner:
(1) Assigned to a job order/key-op (internal usage)
,
(2) Transferred to shop stores inventory,
(3) Returned to the supply system for credit,
(4) Sold to other activities,
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(5) Turned into the supply system after being retained in
UDM for two years, or
(6) Disposed of/scrapped under current Navy and DOD
regulations.
Non-standard material may be disposed of in the following
manner:
(1) Assigned to a job order/key-op,
(2) Transferred to shop stores inventory,
(3) Sold to other activities,
(4) Transferred to Ready Resource Material Program
(RRMP) , or
(5) Held in UDM account for two years and then retained
in UDM account subject to current Navy and DOD
disposal rules.
C. CURRENT UDM ACCOUNTS
Although Mare Island Naval Shipyard's inventory policies
are the focus of this study, it is worthwhile to look at the
aggregate magnitude of the problem of rising UDM inventories
at all eight naval shipyards. Table 1 presents the dollar
value and line item size of UDM accounts at the eight naval
shipyards as of their June 1989 financial statements.
The most significant element in Table 1 is Pearl
Harbor's large UDM account. Pearl Harbor has requested and
has received approval from NAVSEA for an extension of the
two-year excessing policy on UDM material. This is a result
of the increased logistical cost associated with disposal of
material due to transportation costs. Costly acquisition of
emergent material that could potentially be supplied from
17
TABLE 1
UDM INVENTORY ACCOUNT BALANCES





LONG BEACH 32,477,589.00 25,809
PUGET SOUND 16,809,055.64 26,707
MARE ISLAND 18,574,359.69 29,013
PEARL HARBOR 33,048,709.65 78,192
TOTAL 145,640,367.30 AVG . 24,724
their UDM inventory was cited as another reason for
extending the disposal period.
If Pearl Harbor naval shipyard is excluded, the UDM
accounts at naval shipyards average 17,086 line items
totalling $412,591,658. It is important to understand that
this data is just a snapshot in time of the UDM accounts at
the eight naval shipyards. In the near future these figures
may change significantly as a consequence of recent project
completions or recently excessed material.
Table 2 presents the composition of the UDM accounts
with respect to standard and non-standard stock.
18
TABLE 2
COMPOSITION OF UDM INVENTORY



























D. CURRENT NAVSEA GUIDELINES
NAVSEA's current guidance to shipyards dated 3 February
1988, is to have less than ten percent of material ordered
for an overhaul remain unused. [Ref. 5] This goal was
established by NAVSEA as a "ball park" figure to be revised
after evaluating each shipyard's ability to meet this goal.
Currently, NAVSEA reports the shipyards are placing from six
to 15 percent of material ordered for an overhaul into their
UDM accounts. Therefore, NAVSEA feels the ten percent goal
is reasonable.
The author's research at Mare Island Naval Shipyard
revealed the data presented in Table 3 . This data covers
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the last four overhauls completed by Mare Island Naval
Shipyard between February 1987 and August 1989. The
difference between NAVSEA's goal and data presented in Table
3 is substantial.
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF MATERIAL PLACED IN UDM ACCOUNT
TOTAL DMI MATERIAL PLACED % ORDERED PLACED
PROJECT fa) ORDERED ($) IN UDM ($) IN UDM
OVERHAUL 1 14,633,261 3,862,944 26.40
OVERHAUL 2 11,476,734 2,168,254 18.89
OVERHAUL 3 13,820,743 3,112,122 22.52
OVERHAUL 4 14,543,421 3,741,179 25.72
TOTAL $54,474,159 $12,884,499 AVG. 23.38%
Currently, Mare Island Naval Shipyard is receiving 19
cents per dollar of original cost when standard stock is
returned to the supply system. Assuming material placed in
UDM from the above four overhauls has the same composition
as the entire Mare Island UDM account (67% standard material
and 33% non-standard material) , the NIF corpus experienced a
reduction of $8,589,666.
NAVSEA has also defined several other management tools
to assist shipyard management in evaluating their inventory
process. [Ref. 5] First, each shipyard will develop
internal procedures to measure DMI service levels. The
measure should provide a gauge to monitor performance of the
20
objective of having material on hand to support the
industrial process.
Next, each shipyard is tasked with establishing goals
for the percentage of UDM usage both by line item and dollar
value. UDM usage is calculated as follows:
% usage = B/A
where:
A = average monthly value of UDM for the quarter;
B = value of UDM transfers to other shipyards less
disposal actions and supply system turn-ins.
Finally, each shipyard will utilize a monthly UDM report
that indicates current UDM balance and growth or reduction
trends. Trends should be evaluated based on the workload,
completed projects and the dollar value increase of the UDM
account. Numerical goals are to be established based on
current inventory levels and past experience. [Ref. 5:p.
20]
E. SHIPYARD MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
The shipyard management information system (SYMIS) has
two sub-programs that assist with material management: the
Material Requirements (MR) sub-program and the Material
Management (MM) sub-program. A new program being
implemented at all eight naval shipyards to improve unused
material visibility is the Material Visibility Information
21
System (MVIS) . MVIS will eventually become integrated into
the SYMIS.
The MR sub-program is being upgraded to assist shipyard
personnel in the planning phase of an overhaul. The purpose
of this sub-program is to obtain historical usage data for a
"typical" system which will assist the planners in
establishing JML requirements for future overhauls.
Currently, shipyards are able to directly transfer the
material requirements identified for each job order/key-op
for an existing or completed project to a pending project
(thus eliminating the JML process) simply by inputing the
new project number and the planner's identification code.
This reduces the man-hours required for the material
identification process.
Although the shipyards generally agree the new MR system
will work, they feel MR will, in reality, marginally support
their individual needs. Several of the shipyards have
developed their own internal systems they use in lieu of the
MR system.
When it is fully automated, the MR program will receive
input from all eight shipyards and be able to create a
"typical" system JML based on historical usage data. When
the fully automated system comes on line, a planner will
inspect the shipboard system to verify configuration. After
the system is verified to be of the "typical" type, the
planner simply inputs the project number and the planner's
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identification code and requisitions will be electronically
generated to procure the material necessary to overhaul the
system. This system will be integrated with MM and MVIS to
check the initiating yard's and all other shipyards* assets
prior to creating a new procurement. Contingency material
(as outlined by the technical repair standards) will be
included in the list of standard material to be ordered.
Special system or component configurations will still be
handled with the current JML process. Implementation of the
fully automated version of the MR sub-program is scheduled
to be complete by the end of fiscal year 1992.
Prior to placing a new procurement order the material
management (MM) sub-program of the SYMIS automatically
screens the material available at that particular shipyard.
Specifically, the MM system checks the current UDM account
for the same national stock number (NSN) or national item
identification number (NUN) for standard material.
Comparable items for non-standard material must be manually
checked. Each piece of non-standard material listed in the
MM system should reference technical drawings which outline
very detailed material specifications and dimensions. From
these drawings, it is possible to tell if the material
available will fit the needs of the material required.
Checking UDM accounts for non-standard material is very time
consuming, tedious and often cost prohibitive unless the
material is not on hand and is needed for a key event such
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as undocking. Because the system is not user friendly, it
is not often used.
If no items are found, the system orders the amount
outlined on the JML. If material is found, it is identified
by the SYMIS as being available in the UDM account and the
quantity required is reduced by the number available on
yard. The remaining quantity is ordered as a new
procurement. If the number available in the UDM account
exceeds the quantity required, all the items are identified
as being available in the UDM account and no new procurement
is necessary.
Although the MM sub-program of the SYMIS allows a
shipyard to screen its assets prior to generating a new
procurement, they are not configured to provide interyard
material visibility. The Material Visibility Information
System (MVIS) is a system that will make the UDM accounts,
category 4 DMI , and category 5 DMI at all eight naval
shipyards visible to other shipyards.
There are four major functions of MVIS:
(1) Determine item availability,
(2) Maintain material information,
(3) Calculate material usage statistics, and
(4) Display inspection code information (technical
documentation)
.
Under the fully automated system, when a material
requirement is identified by a JML, MM will first screen the
initiating shipyard's assets. If the material is not found,
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MVIS will automatically screen the remaining seven
shipyard's UDM accounts for the material in an order
predetermined by the initiating shipyard. If the desired
material is not available, or cannot be released from an
external shipyard, then a new procurement must be generated.
When desired material is located at an external
shipyard, the material planner must contact the cognizant
material manager of the holding shipyard to arrange
acquisition of the needed material. This contact is
necessary to:
(1) Obtain release permission from the cognizant material
manager in the case of restricted items,
(2) Verify availability of desired quantity, physical
condition, proper quality attributes, etc.,
(3) Negotiate cost, payback requirements, etc., as
appropriate, and
(4) Arrange packaging and shipping and associated
changes. [Ref. 6:p. 20]
A pilot program began in June 1988 between Mare Island
Naval Shipyard and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Expansion of
this system to include all eight shipyards in a manual mode
should be complete by October 1989. A fully automated
system is scheduled to be in place by September 1990.
The current expansion of the SYMIS to include excess
material at all eight naval shipyards is a result of the
Navy Industrial Improvement Program (NIIP) . NIIP, the
responsibility of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy,
was founded to resolve the potential problems outlined at
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Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) activities by the private
accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand in 1984 (to be
discussed in detail in Chapter III of this study)
.
F. SUMMARY
Shipyard material is recorded in three inventory
accounts: Direct Material Inventory (DMI) , Shop Stores (SS)
and Unassigned Direct Material (UDM) . The DMI account
consists of material obtained for a specific overhaul or
project that is in a current status. Shop stores inventory
is based on items with recurring demand or common use. UDM
inventory is surplus material formally assigned to one of
the other inventory accounts with a potential future use.
An integral part of inventory control/ inventory
management at shipyards is accomplished by the MM sub-
program of the SYMIS. This program records the current
assets held by the shipyard. It automatically screens these
assets prior to allowing a new procurement to be issued.
Similar to the MM sub-program is the Material Visibility
Information System (MVIS) which will allow all naval
shipyard's excess material assets to be screened prior to
issuing a new procurement.
Formally recorded historical usage data are not
currently available to planners. A fully automated MR sub-
program will define material requirements for a "typical"
system and electronically transfer these requirements to the
supply department thus eliminating the JML process.
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These concepts and systems are the basis for
understanding the inventory philosophy exercised at naval
shipyards. They are critical to understanding the inventory




A. COOPERS & LYBRAND STUDY
Being squeezed by a shrinking budget and under the
scrutiny of Congressional leaders, the Navy is taking a
closer look at material costs at naval shipyards. In the
mid-1980' s, the Navy contracted with the private accounting
firm of Coopers & Lybrand to conduct an impartial management
analysis of the Navy Industrial Fund activities. In June
198 6, they released the shipyard segment of this study.
Within the shipyard segment is a chapter on inventory
management/ inventory control titled Materials Management.
An important point emphasized by the study is that
material management does not stand alone because this
subject crosses functional boundaries. It directly affects
the shipyard's ability to carry out their mission: over-
hauling and repairing ships on time, within cost, and to the
requisite quality standards. [Ref. 7:p. MM-2]
Several problems outlined by the Coopers & Lybrand study
no longer exist. The author did not attempt to discern
whether these changes resulted due to changes implemented in
response to the study. But several of the identified
problems still haunt the Navy's materials management at
shipyards. The following paragraphs outline the problems
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the Coopers & Lybrand study presented and the author
believes still are pertinent.
The current inventory system does not track and measure
the material planning process. This inadequate
documentation could lead to improper repair parts ordered
and possibly insufficient or surplus material. A reason the
process is untracked can be attributed to its complexity.
The planning, sourcing, processing and distribution
functions of material management are fragmented over several
organizations. Planning and Estimating (P&E) is a division
within the planning department. P&E planners, shop
planners, progressmen, and craftsmen often suggest different
material requirements for the same job with P&E planners
responsible for the final determination of material
requirements. Fueling the problem is the fact that there is
little or no incentive to the planners to increase the
accuracy of material ordering or to reduce the inventory in
the UDM account.
Contrary to NAVSEA's policy, most of the shipyards have
internal policies that require all material be on hand prior
to the commencement of an overhaul. Material planning
driven by a single commencement date forces little attention
to be paid to cost. This leads to increased inventory
management costs for the following reasons:
1. Procurement and sourcing priorities become confused
and meaningless because it is difficult to determine what
material is actually needed first. All items have the
same RDD regardless of actual required dates to support
29
production. As a result premium pay is spent to ensure
delivery of materials that are not needed for months while
items critical to production are overlooked, disrupting
work in process.
2. Unnecessary costs are incurred for warehousing and
maintaining inventory before they are required for
production.
3. Increased staff support of procurement specialists and
expediters is required to meet the artificial materials
procurement workloads. This results in unnecessary,
continuing indirect personnel costs. [Ref. 7: p. MM-6]
After the material requirements have been decided, the
multiple handling of JML's makes their processing very labor
intensive and complex. Also, it makes accountability within
the system very difficult. Any attempt to associate an
error to a particular segment of the process often results
in finger pointing between and within departments. The lack
of accountability can lead to inefficiencies in material
ordering or, in the worst case, fraudulent use of the
inventory system.
Once material has been received, shipyards do not have
methods to accurately measure material usage during an
overhaul. Furthermore, they do not have a system that
measures performance in material ordered vs. material usage.
This problem has been masked by a labor-intensive process
which often considers material costs monetarily
insignificant (material is approximately 20 percent of the
total overhaul cost) . Emphasizing this fact is the
incorporation of material costs into the stabilized man-day
rate thus reducing its visibility.
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Further hampering the planners is the fact that a
historical usage database does not exist. Also, material
and procurement leadtimes are not adequately recorded.
These two factors result in inadequate or surplus material
being ordered or not being available to support the
industrial process. Another repercussion is that historical
usage/leadtime data cannot be shared with other shipyards.
After material is issued, material control methods are
inadequate to ensure effective control of inventories. A
system does not exist to track material actually being used
for work in process. Because usage data includes material
issued but not used, creation of a historical usage database
will be inaccurate until this deficiency is corrected.
One of the results of improper documentation of prior
usage is that 20 percent of the total materials ordered for
the overhaul are ordered after the commencement date. This
necessitates the use of personnel to expedite material in an
attempt to support the industrial process. The causes of
the initial oversights are: (1) improper or inadequate
planning often caused by poor historical usage
documentation; or (2) changes in the overhaul package by the
customer. It is inevitable that some material will be
ordered after the overhaul commencement due to not being
able to identify deficient material until the system is
opened and inspected. However, Coopers & Lybrand feel 20
percent is excessive.
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Finally, Coopers & Lybrand found that shipyards as an
aggregate conduct a minimal amount of joint procurement.
This squanders the opportunity for shipyards to benefit from
economies of scale.
B. GOVERNMENT STUDIES
GAO and the Naval Audit Service have also conducted
studies concerning inventory control/ inventory management at
naval shipyards. Several of the problems identified by
these agencies have already been discussed in the previous
section. For brevity, only those deficiencies not
previously covered will be discussed below.
The Naval Audit Service audit dated 8 December 1987
titled "System Visibility of Material Inventory at Naval
Shipyards" was conducted at Philadelphia, Mare Island and
Puget Sound Naval Shipyards. The internal control system at
the audited shipyards was not adequate to prevent or detect
material errors or irregularities with respect to the age of
the material in category 4 DMI or UDM status. As shown in
Table 4, approximately 80 percent of category 4 DMI was
retained for greater than thirty days after the job order
was complete. Also, one shipyard had a significant amount
of material that remained in the UDM account beyond the two-
year cutoff point. [Ref. 8:p. 2]
GAO began documenting inventory management problems at
naval shipyards as early as 1978. [Ref. 9] As a result of
that study, NAVSEA instructed the shipyards to establish
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Source: Naval Audit Service Audit Report, System
Visibility of Material Inventory at Naval
Shipyards , 8 December 1987.
data banks to formally document historical usage. At
approximately the same time, NAVSEA supplied the shipyards
with an improved version of the MR sub-program to assist
them with this task.
Prompted by rising inventory levels, GAO conducted
another study of material management at naval shipyards in
1985. Another reason for concern was that many production
supervisors attributed reduced efficiencies to material
problems. [Ref. 10] The 1985 study revealed that shipyards
do not effectively determine direct material reguirements
for future overhauls. Two reasons were outlined:
historical usage information on prior overhauls is not
analyzed, and complete and accurate usage data are not
collected. [Ref. 11 :p. 4] Analysis of this information
would allow planners to minimize material shortages and
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surpluses and help reduce the quantity of material ordered
after an overhaul begins.
GAO believed that the lack of historical usage
information and analysis contributed to the accumulation of
unused material at naval shipyards. This unused material
also increases costs because time and money are spent to
order, store, and dispose of unneeded material. Table 5
outlines the magnitude of the surplus material problem
existing at naval shipyards for overhauls completed between
January 1982 and March 1984. While no specific standards
exist, private shipyards, naval shipyards, and NAVSEA
officials agreed that the amount of unused material
associated with the industrial process of repairing or
overhauling ships should not exceed five to 15 percent of
ordered material. [Ref. ll:p. 7]
Recurring material shortages reduce efficiency and
increase labor costs. There are two reasons material
shortages reduce efficiency. First, personnel are required
to manually process and expedite requisitions. Table 6
reveals the quantity of time supply department personnel at
Norfolk Naval Shipyard spent expediting. Often shipyards
have personnel whose sole job is expediting. Proper
planning could eliminate these positions and allow time
devoted by supply department personnel to expediting to be
focused on their regular duties.
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TABLE 5











NORFOLK 133.9 33.6 25.09
PHILADELPHIA 177.7 13.3 7.48
CHARLESTON 93.8 21.1 22.49
LONG BEACH 99.4 14.4 (b) 14.49
PUGET SOUND 218.5 31.9 14.60
MARE ISLAND 116.5 7.9 6.78
PEARL HARBOR 82.8 14.7 17.75
TOTAL 989.9 166.8 16.85
(a) In some instances, the amount of unused material
reported was understated because it was taken from shipyard
reports prepared during the overhauls. These reports did
not include unused materials which were turned in after the
reports were issued. NAVSEA officials noted that amounts
reported also included some duplicate items because
materials not used on one overhaul could be transferred to a
future overhaul and still not be used.
(b) Includes $7 million in unused materials for the U.S.S.
New Jersey. Long Beach had reported $307,000 in its
financial statement, but the Navy Auditor General stated
excess materials were worth $7 million.
Source: United States General Accounting Office
Report, The Navy Can Improve Material
Management at Naval Shipyards , 6 May 1985.
The second reason material shortages reduce efficiency
and increase labor costs is that personnel must spend time
on such activities as rescheduling work and searching for
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TABLE 6
SUPPLY DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL EXPEDITING
AT NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL % OF TIME SPENT
DIVISION EXPEDITING EXPEDITING
RECEIPT CONTROL 40 90
STOCK MANAGEMENT 6 75
PURCHASING 13 60
SHOP STORES 6 50
TECHNICAL 13 5
Source: United States General Accounting Office
Report, The Navy Can Improve Material
Management at Naval Shipyards , 6 May 198 5.
materials. As a result of this and the expediting process,
higher priority requisitions than would have otherwise been
required are generated. Higher priority requisitions often
require manual processing prior to processing other existing
requisitions, thus slowing the overall Navy supply system
response times. OPNAV Instruction 4614. IF states that no
more than 50 percent of all shipyard requisitions submitted
shall be categorized as high priority (Issue Group Priority
I). [Ref. l:p. 38] GAO found all eight naval shipyards to
be in violation of this policy in July 1985 (see Table 7)
.
[Ref 12:p. 21]
GAO also found that organizational goals and individual
performance standards are needed. Shipyards have not been
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(a) Did not exceed guideline
Source: United States General Accounting Office
Report, Intermediate Inventories Can Be
Reduced . October 1986.
provided by NAVSEA which were designed to improve materials
management. Because the shipyard personnel performance
evaluation system does not hold material management
personnel accountable for meeting outlined standards and
goals, shipyards have been ineffective in implementing
prescribed procedures designed to improve material
management efficiency.
C . SUMMARY
Studies began outlining problems in inventory management
at naval shipyards 11 years ago. Inadequate documentation
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of historical usage data is the root cause of several
identified deficiencies. Material shortages result due to
incomplete documentation. This leads to reduced efficiency
and increased labor costs because people are required to
expedite material often resulting in a higher than
originally needed priority on material requisitions. Most
shipyards have attempted to correct the problem of
inadequate material to support the industrial process by
mandating all material be on hand prior to overhaul
commencement. This increases the carrying costs of
inventories. Shipyards also squander a potential cost
reduction by not engaging in joint procurements.
Organizational goals and performance standards are
needed to specifically outline a shipyard's policy
concerning materials management. Once the goals are
established and all material management personnel are
familiar with them, an aggressive attempt to meet the goals
should be pursued. Also, an internal control system must be
developed to ensure the outlined standards are followed.
The financial impact of these problems is significant.
Material management needs to be placed high on all
shipyards' lists of priorities.
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IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. DIRECT MATERIAL INVENTORY
As noted in Chapter III, the root cause of escalating
inventories at naval shipyards can be traced to not
correctly identifying material requirements. Deficiencies
within this identification process lead to wide variations
in quantity of material ordered for similar projects. These
deficiencies include: (1) inadequate communication between
the planners and shops performing the work; (2) inadeguate
documentation and recording of historical usage data; and
(3) lack of accountability within the performance evaluation
of planners.
Extensive communication between the shops and planners
is necessary so that feedback from the personnel actually
performing the work can be used by the planners to identify
potential material shortages or surpluses. A current
project at Mare Island Naval Shipyard has progressed much
smoother than previous projects with unused material being
estimated far below their previous values. The success of
this project is being largely attributed to better
communication between planners and the shops. Without an
historical usage database (the current situation) and
feedback, the planner can only base the quantity of material
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ordered on personal observations, prior experience, and the
experience of his/her fellow planners.
Many of the problems associated with surplus material
result because of inaccurate or inadequate documentation of
historical usage. Another important point is an accurate
historical usage database will also result in less material
shortages. This means less work stoppages because the
craftsmen lack material. Also, less time and hence money
will be spent on expediting material through the supply
system after the overhaul commences. Currently personal
information is what is used to make judgments on how much
material to order. Hopefully this method will only last for
a short period until the automated process of material
requirements identification associated with the MR sub-
program is introduced.
To ensure usage data is accurate for initially
establishing a database and for updating the database,
shipyards must aggressively pursue a policy of minimizing
bench spares maintained by shops. Shops at Mare Island take
all the material for a job order into their custody. Shop
planners are responsible for issuing the material to support
work. They are also responsible to ensure material issued
but not used is returned to the supply system. Management
and workers both feel the administrative process associated
with turning-in unused parts is too time consuming. They
feel the process must be streamlined before it can be
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effectively used. Controlling unused material ensures the
historical usage database reflects material actually used
and not material issued.
Although the performance evaluation system for planners
varies from shipyard to shipyard, as a whole very little
emphasis is placed on the material identification process.
Only a small portion of the planner's time is expended on
identifying material requirements and completing JML's.
Because of this fact, only a small portion of their
evaluation is based on successful material requirements
identification. In fact, most shipyards use the number of
material shortages as their yardstick for measuring a
planner's performance with respect to material
identification. This naturally causes the ordering of
surplus material and hence the UDM account grows.
B. UNASSIGNED DIRECT MATERIAL
UDM accounts at naval shipyards continue to increase.
In 1985, UDM accounts at all eight naval shipyards totaled
$50.4 million. [Ref. 11] As of their June 1989 financial
statements, the current UDM total at naval shipyards is
$145.63 million. This is a 189 percent increase or a 47.25
percent increase per year.
The management tools outlined by NAVSEA to prevent a
further increase in the UDM inventory are not being fully
utilized by naval shipyards. Furthermore, many people the
author interviewed who are involved in the planning process
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did not know these guidelines existed or where their
shipyard was with respect to establishing or using them.
As shown by Table 3, the goal of limiting the inventory
in UDM to no more than ten percent of all DMI ordered for an
overhaul into UDM is not being achieved.
Another management tool outlined by NAVSEA but unused by
naval shipyards is percent usage statistics. These
statistics provide a shipyard with information concerning
the percentage of their UDM accounts that is transferred to
other shipyards during the period of the report. Because
this program is in its infant stages, NAVSEA has not yet
established goals with respect to percent usage. Although
shipyard management cannot directly affect these values
(they are driven by the remaining seven shipyards 1 demands
for material they hold) , low usage could mean it is not cost
effective to carry material past the two-year limit set by
NAVSEA. This two-year limit is set by the Office of the
Comptroller and is outlined in Reference 3 (The Navy
Comptroller Manual)
.
Currently, shipyards carry material in UDM longer than
two years. There are several reasons for this. First, the
small amount of money received for turning standard stock
items into the supply system often discourages turning the
material in, particularly for high dollar value items. The
dollar value received for unused material is very low
because NAVSUP has adopted a policy of zero money being paid
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for turned-in items unless an outstanding demand exists.
Non-standard material has no turn-in value with the
exception of what the shipyard can receive from the material
as scrap.
Prior to excessing material, the shipyard must weigh the
cost of storing and managing the material against the
probability a demand will arise for the item and they will
be able to recover their entire investment. The costs of
maintaining material in inventory include:
(1) Cost of taking physical inventories;
(2) Cost of maintaining inventory records;
(3) Cost of shelf life surveys;
(4) The differential between costs of commercial storage
sites or commercial versus government-owned storage
sites, if applicable;
(5) Other additional costs, if any. [Ref. 13 :p. 3]
An example of retaining material occurred at Long Beach
Naval Shipyard. Table 1 showed that Long Beach's UDM
account was at approximately $32 million in June 1989. This
account balance was large because for several years, Long
Beach maintained a policy of not excessing standard stock in
hope that a demand would arise and they could recover their
entire investment. They have recently changed this policy
and have a goal of excessing $2 million of material each
month until all the material in the UDM account meets the
two-year recency reguirement. Their UDM account balance in
November 1989 was $22,190,686.
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In order for Long Beach to excess material in the above
example, their NIF corpus had to absorb the financial loss
associated with receiving far less money for the material
than they originally paid. This loss was created because
the shipyard does not receive reimbursement for material
placed in the UDM account. Therefore, the corpus is
replenished (by the customer when the job is complete) at a
lesser value than the material purchased.
In private industry this cost of surplus material would
be passed onto the customer through higher rates to perform
the work or the company would just receive less profit. NIF
activities are non-profit units and only charge the customer
for material and labor used to complete the project.
Overhead is also factored into the stabilized man-day
rate. This overhead rate is affected by UDM because the
maintenance, manning and upkeep of the warehouses the
material is stored in is part of shipyard overhead.
The unwillingness of the shipyard's comptroller's office
to have the NIF corpus absorb the financial loss associated
with excessing material from the UDM account often forces
shipyards to carry the material longer than two years.
Recently (October 1989) , NAVSEA directed SPCC to check
their outstanding orders against the UDM accounts at all
eight naval shipyards. This action found that 500 line
items back-ordered at SPCC were available in naval shipyard
UDM accounts. The dollar value savings was $3 million.
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This process, performed periodically and coupled with the
MVIS program, could help reduce the UDM inventory growth
problem currently confronting naval shipyards.
C. SHIPYARD MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
Probably the most critical step in reducing the UDM
inventory account involves the SYMIS. The development of an
historical usage database by the MR sub-program should
significantly reduce the surplus material placed in the UDM
account. This is because more accurate identification of
material reguirements will result in less surpluses and
shortages of material.
The automated MR sub-program was originally scheduled to
be available to shipyards by September 1989. This delivery
date has slipped to the end of fiscal year 1992. The delay
for full implementation of an automated MR sub-program is
funding related. The problem is all programs must have a
definite benefit in order to warrant expenditures. But
cost-benefit studies on management information systems are
very marginal at best. This is because the benefits are not
easily guantified and are often over long periods of time
(as is the case with the MR sub-program) . The costs, on the
other hand, are easily identified and often are very large
up- front.
The MVIS program attacks the UDM problem from a
different perspective. Whereas the MR sub-program will help
solve the root cause of UDM growth, MVIS attacks material
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that is already surplus by increasing its visibility. This
program is a very positive step in the correct direction to
reduce UDM inventory.
D. SUMMARY
The root cause of growing UDM accounts at naval
shipyards evolves from the material planning phase of the
ship overhaul process and the reduced visibility of material
once it is designated as surplus. Specifically, inaccurate
identification of material reguirements naturally lead to
surpluses which swell the UDM account. Furthermore,
planners are only held accountable to ensure no shortages
occur. They are not evaluated based on goals outlined by
NAVSEA.
Once material is placed in the UDM account, management
tools are not used to monitor UDM inventory. Material is
held longer than the time limit because of shipyards'
unwillingness to accept a financial loss in hope of
recovering their full investment.
The SYMIS could have a major impact on the reduction of
the UDM account. A swift development of the MR sub-program,
which would establish a historical usage database, would
correct the most glaring problem causing UDM account growth.
This coupled with the positive steps being taken to increase
UDM account visibility could significantly reduce UDM
account balances.
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Because the reduction in real dollars allocated to the
Defense budget over the last five years is projected to
continue well into the 1990 's, it is critical for naval
shipyards to better manage their inventories. This study
examined the inventory process at naval shipyards with
emphasis on the creation and disposal of unassigned direct
material
.
The primary mission of the eight naval shipyards is to
overhaul naval vessels. Emphasis is placed on accomplishing
this task within a predetermined amount of time agreed upon
by the shipyard conducting the overhaul and NAVSEA.
Shipyards are also expected to complete this work within a
predetermined budget. Because the overhaul process is very
labor intensive, the primary focus is on production control.
Inventory control and, consequently, inventory costs are
often regarded as monetarily insignificant.
Inventory control/ inventory management for ship
overhauls begins with the planning phase. During this
period, material requirements are identified and material is
ordered. Accurate and timely material identification
directly effects two of the three missions Mare Island Naval
Shipyard has outlined it shall strive to achieve: complete
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all projects on time and complete all projects within
budget. Once the material is received, it becomes part of a
particular project's DMI . Material is drawn from this
account throughout the overhaul to support the industrial
process.
Upon completion of job orders or 60 days after the
overhaul is complete, all unused material must be disposed
of, transferred to an existing project or sent to the UDM
account. The UDM inventory is material which the shipyard
believes will have a future (within two years) demand.
Excessing material from the UDM account is accomplished when
the shipyard foresees no future demand.
The funding to accomplish work at naval shipyards is
provided by the Navy Industrial Fund. It is essentially a
working capital account (called the corpus) which works on a
revolving basis. The outlays are to purchase material, pay
wages, and maintain facilities. If material is placed in
the UDM account and eventually excessed at a price less than
what the shipyard paid, this action serves to reduce the NIF
corpus. This results in additional funds being needed by
the shipyards from the Navy's budget.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The author believes the brunt of the emphasis necessary
to solve the problem of growing UDM inventories needs to be
focused on the planning phase and the correct identification
of material requirements. This is not being done at present
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and, coupled with the reduced visibility of material in the
UDM account, is the root cause of increasing UDM accounts.
Extensive communication between the planners and the end
users of the material, .shops performing the work, is
critical to accurately document and identify material
reguirements. Shop planners must be held accountable for
the accumulation of bench spares. Unused material that is
not returned to the supply system results in inaccurate
overhaul usage statistics which will result in the same
guantity being ordered for the next overhaul.
A critical input the planner currently lacks to perform
a good material reguirements analysis is accurate historical
usage data. The creation and use of a historical usage
database from the MR sub-program of the SYMIS should solve
this problem. Once an automated MR sub-program is
established, integration of the SYMIS will reduce the data
redundancy and duplicate work currently generated by
planners. Establishing an historical usage database as
guickly as possible should be number one on naval shipyards'
list of priorities. This single action will have a far
greater impact than any other recommendations on reducing
the UDM account growth.
An additional enhancement to the MR sub-program would be
the identification of contingency material reguirements.
Currently, contingency material reguirements are outlined by
the Automated Material Reguirements List (AMRL) for only
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about 2 percent of systems repaired during an overhaul
(mission critical items)
.
After material requirements have been identified,
shipyards often squander the opportunity of quantity
discounts. Joint procurements by shipyards should be
analyzed for their cost effectiveness.
The next step should be to modify the planner's
performance evaluations to reflect the timeliness and
accuracy of their material requirements identification
process. Material requirements identification is far more
important than the portion the current planners evaluation
system gives to it.
GAO recommended setting goals for the planners in the
following areas:
(1) Percentage of material ordered after overhaul
commencement ; and
(2) Percentage of unused direct materials after each
overhaul
.
Once these goals are set and adequate experience is gained
in using them, GAO and the author recommend that NAVSEA
should require that shipyards include appropriate standards
in the performance appraisals of those employees responsible
for material management activities and hold them accountable
for meeting these standards. [Ref. 11: p. iv]
If necessary, personnel could specialize in material
requirements identification to relieve them of other duties
associated with being a planner. This would eliminate the
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problem of how to weigh each of the tasks performed by
planners on their performance evaluations. Also it would
facilitate accountability for material shortages and
surpluses.
Additional inputs for management to evaluate the
performance of the materials process at naval shipyards that
are currently only marginally used have been outlined by
NAVSEA. These include:
(1) A long term goal of having less than ten percent of
direct material ordered for overhaul remain unused at
overhaul completion;
(2) Percent usage statistics calculated and distributed
to inform management how successful the shipyard
currently is with respect to disposing of UDM to
other shipyards or supply activities; and
(3) Disbursement of monthly UDM reports emphasizing
growth or reduction trends.
Once material is placed in the UDM accounts, its usage
will be dependent on its visibility. This visibility must
be increased. The MVIS program currently being implemented
is a very positive step in that direction. Another method
of making shipyards' UDM accounts visible is to require SPCC
to check the UDM accounts every time they get another set of
planned requirements from NAVSEA. Comparing UDM accounts
with outstanding orders at SPCC, done in October 1989,
resulted in a reduction of UDM accounts of approximately $3
million. The author recommends that incorporating the UDM
accounts into the planned program requirements process be
evaluated for feasibility as soon as possible. This action
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coupled with the MVIS program could reduce the current UDM
inventory accounts.
C. FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several areas of future research that naval
shipyards and NAVSEA could benefit from. An area that
continues to be debated is, can shipyards afford stock-outs
and for how long? An analysis of the cost (due to idle
labor and resources) of stocking only a percentage of the
material versus the benefit (due to zero stock-outs) of
stocking all the material possibly expected to be needed
could be beneficial to ensure the most economical path is
taken. Improved supply support from a local stock point
may be the best answer.
Further studies should also be conducted to ensure the
MVIS program currently being implemented is providing the
necessary visibility to the UDM accounts to reduce their
balances. Also, once the MR sub-program upgrade is
implemented it should be evaluated to ensure the historical
usage database that is critically needed by planners is easy
to use and provides accurate material requirements.
Finally, after the above recommendations have been
implemented, a follow-on study should be conducted to
evaluate their effectiveness and make additional





APL Allowance Parts List
COAR Customer Order Acceptance Record
DMI Direct Material Inventory
JML Job Material List
Key-op Key Operation
MM Material Management sub-program
MR Material Requirements sub-program
MVIS Material Visibility Information System
NIF Navy Industrial Fund
NUN National Item Identification Number
NIIP Navy Industrial Improvement Program
NSN National Stock Number
RDD Required Delivery Date
SS Shop Stores
SYMIS Shipyard Management Information System
TRS Technical Repair Standard
UDM Unassigned Direct Material
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